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Introduction 
A worker in the private sector is accorded job security pursuant to section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (“IRA”) where 
his ‘property right’ should not be deprived of save 
for just cause or excuse. The employer’s prerogative 
to dismiss an employee on grounds of misconduct 
or due to redundancy in the organisation is 
equally recognised. However, where dismissal 
is contemplated the requirement of substantive 
justifi cation and procedural fairness must be strictly 
adhered to by the employer. An employee who 
alleges unfair dismissal from employment may 
have his grievance litigated in the Industrial Court. 
The burden is on the employer to prove that he 
has just cause or excuse for taking the decision 
to impose the disciplinary measure of dismissal 
upon the employee. Adequate evidence must be 
produced to substantiate the allegation against the 
employee such as misconduct, negligence or poor 
performance, among others. 
It is undeniable that the aggrieved employee would 
incur costs to bring a claim in the Industrial Court 
against the employer for dismissal without just 
cause or excuse. The employer would also incur 
costs to defend themselves from the employee’s 
claim that the dismissal was without just cause or 
excuse. Hence, the issue that forms the basis of 
this article is whether the costs incurred by either 
party in bringing or defending their claims for unfair 
dismissal would be recoverable. In plain English, 
‘costs’ would mean fees, charges, disbursements, 
expenses and remuneration.1 In the context of legal 
proceedings, ‘costs’ would generally mean the 
charges which a solicitor is entitled to make and 
recover as remuneration for his professional services, 
1 Order 59 rule 1(1) of the Rules of the Court 2012.
including the provision of legal advice, attendance in 
court, the drafting and copying of documents and 
conducting legal proceedings, among others. It too 
means the expenses which a successful litigant 
would be entitled to recover from the other side by 
reason of his being a party to legal proceedings. Such 
expenses include the court fees and the reasonable 
and proper charges and fees of the solicitor, if the 
party had been represented by a solicitor.
The awarding of costs is at the discretion of the 
court and the amount to be awarded must be 
reasonable which generally would depend on the 
nature and extent of any disputed issues. It cannot 
be denied that litigating a dispute in the court is an 
expensive affair and in some cases it might even 
involve the litigant’s life savings as the vast majority of 
people are in the lower and middle income bracket.2 
Hence, the expenses incurred by the succeeding 
party to establish his claim in the courts must be 
recoverable from the unsuccessful party. In certain 
circumstances, the courts have even made the 
solicitors liable to bear the costs of litigation especially 
when it was disclosed that it was the solicitor who 
instigated the fi ling or defending of the unmeritorious 
application. In Dato’ Ting Check Sii v Mohamad 
Tufail bin Mahmud & Ors,3 Hamid Sultan Abu Backer 
JC stated: ‘Any solicitor who takes unmeritorious 
procedural objections must be made liable to pay 
costs personally. Such an order will arrest procedural 
skirmishes in limine and pave way for cases to be 
heard on merits and this will also be a good step to 
reduce backlog of cases, as it will act as a deterrent 
to fi le unmeritorious application or raise objections.’ 
Dismissal without just cause or excuse: 
Adjudication in the Industrial Court
A claim for dismissal without just cause or excuse 
pursuant to section 20(1) of the IRA will pass 
2 In R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of 
Malaysia and Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, Eusoff 
Chin CJ stated: ‘Employers can certainly afford 
to employ a number of lawyers and prolong 
litigation and thereby tiring out the workers. The 
poor workman can ill afford a lawyer or prolong 
litigation because this will lead to immense 
hardship, suffering and exorbitant expenses.’
3 [2007] 5 MLJ 339. See also Sabu Development 
Sdn Bhd v Kelik Anak Bayel [2007] 8 MLJ 264.
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different levels, namely, the conciliatory level (where 
the Director General of the Industrial Relations 
Department seeks to conciliate over the dispute), 
reporting level (where the Director General reports 
to the Honourable Minister after finding the dispute 
irreconcilable), referral level (where the Honourable 
Minister decides whether or not to refer the dispute 
to the Industrial Court), and the adjudicatory level 
at the Industrial Court.4 Where the representation 
has been referred to the Industrial Court, the court 
shall before setting the matter down for trial, hold 
a case management involving the disputants and 
their counsel, which serves to prepare the parties 
for trial by identifying inter alia, the essential issues. 
At this stage, the chairman assigned to hear the 
matter would issue the following possible directives: 
(i) directing the parties to mediate their dispute or 
offering mediation services to the parties with a 
view of speedy disposal of the dispute;5 (ii) directing 
the parties to furnish particulars of their claim and/
or the filing of pleadings; (iii) requiring the parties 
to formulate and settle the principal issues to be 
determined at the trial;6 (iv) ordering the parties to 
deliver their respective list of documents that may 
be used at the trial of the action; (v) directing the 
parties to furnish to the court and to exchange 
between themselves a bundle containing each 
of their respective documents;7 (vi) directing the 
parties to exchange and file a statement of agreed 
facts; (vii) limiting the number of witnesses that each 
party to the action may call at the trial; (viii) ordering 
the administration of interrogatories;8 (ix) fixing a 
date for the hearing of the action; (x) directing the 
parties to file the witness statements, for example, 
4 See Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, Dismissal from 
Employment and the Remedies, Second Edition 
(2014, LexisNexis (M) Sdn Bhd. Petaling Jaya).
5 See WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Norsa’ida Abdul 
Ghani [2005] 3 ILR 268j.
6 See Tecomas (M) Sdn Bhd v Lee Choon Keong 
[2005] 2 ILR 725.
7 See Carling Air Compressor Sdn Bhd v Leong 
Chee Kuen [2005] 2 ILR 128. 
8 See Yano Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Fazila 
Bahadin [2006]  3  ILR  1570. In this case, the 
Industrial Court in allowing the company to 
administer interrogatories to the claimant, states: 
‘any steps that are taken “to reduce the issues 
or the length of trial and the saving of time and 
cost” should always be encouraged. This stand 
or spirit must be allowed to supersede any 
technicalities or legal form that may be found to 
be restrictive or prohibitive in any statutory form 
or guise.’
when there is difficulty in tracing the witnesses;9 and 
(xii) dealing with all the applications for amendments 
to the pleadings,10 among others.
Within fourteen days of the date fixed for hearing, 
the parties will be required to submit an agreed 
bundle of documents relating to the case and an 
agreed statement of facts if any, which shall form 
part of the documentary evidence.11 Furthermore, 
the chairman may, if he thinks fit, permit any party 
to state the evidence of its witness by way of 
affidavit and/or affidavit-in-reply at least one month 
before the date of hearing. If such a course is 
taken, the chairman shall, on an application to be 
made by the opposite party within fourteen days 
of service of the affidavit, require the deponent of 
such affidavit to be present and be examined orally 
at the hearing.12 Such affidavit and examination 
arising therefrom shall form part of the record and 
proceedings of the Court.13 
The taking of ‘witness statements’ is also 
encouraged which is mainly to expedite the hearing 
of a case. The court may also, if it appears desirable 
in the interests of justice and upon an application 
being made, order by way of summons any party: 
(a) to state on oath orally or by affidavit about 
documents he has or he has had in his possession 
or power relating to the matters in question; and 
(b) to produce any documents in his possession 
or power.14
At the trial of the matter, the President or the 
Chairman, as the case may be, shall call upon 
such party, as he may think fit, to state his case 
and to adduce evidence, if any, in support thereof. 
The opposite party shall thereafter state his case 
and adduce evidence, if any, in support thereof. 
The first party shall then be at liberty to reply to the 
matters raised by the opposite party and thereafter 
the opposite party shall be at liberty to reply to the 
matters raised by the first party in his reply.15 
9 See Southern Bank Berhad v Johnny Phun Chye 
Jin [2008] 1 ILR 323.
10 See Dectra Sdn Bhd v Cynthia Geraldine De 
Castro [2005] 3 ILR 261. See Abdul Malik Ishak, 
‘Summons for Directions and Other Related 
Issues Together With Case Management: 
A Synopsis’ [2004] 3 MLJ lxxxiii.
11 See Industrial Court Rules 1967, rule 21A(1).
12 ibid, rule 21A(2).
13 ibid, rule 21A(3).
14 ibid, rule 21B(1).
15 ibid, rule 22.
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In relation to the examination of witnesses, the 
Industrial Court relies on section  137 of the 
Evidence Act 1950 which deals with examination 
of witness. This is because there are no specifi c 
provisions in either the IRA or in the Industrial Court 
Rules 1967 on the production and examination 
of witnesses. Section  137 provides that the 
examination of a witness by the party who calls 
him would be called an examination-in-chief. The 
examination of a witness by the adverse party shall 
be called a cross-examination and where a witness 
has been cross-examined and is then examined by 
the party who called him, such examination would 
be called a re-examination.
It is worth noting that the employer bears the burden 
to demonstrate the reason for the employee’s 
dismissal. Whether or not the dismissal was with 
or without just cause or excuse depends entirely 
on the reasons shown by the employer at the time 
of the employee’s dismissal and the employer is 
at liberty to call on any witnesses or adduce any 
documents.16 If the employer has alleged that the 
claimant had resigned voluntarily from the company 
or had abandoned the job, the employer then has 
to prove that the claimant had abandoned his 
job.17 Again, if the employer provides redundancy 
as the reason for the termination, it is incumbent 
upon the employer to prove that there was indeed 
redundancy in the organisation that led to the 
retrenchment exercise and that the consequential 
retrenchment was made in compliance with 
accepted standards of procedure.18 
16 This is in line with article 9(2) of the ILO’s Convention 
Concerning Termination of Employment at the 
Initiative of the Employer (Convention No. 158 of 
1982) which provides: ‘in order for the worker not 
to have to bear alone the burden of proving that 
the termination was not justifi ed, the methods 
of implementation referred to in Article 1 of this 
Convention shall provide for one or the other or 
both of the following possibilities: (a) the burden 
of proving the existence of a valid reason for 
the termination as defi ned in Article 4 of this 
Convention shall rest on the employer; (b) the 
bodies referred to in Article 8 of this Convention 
shall be empowered to reach a conclusion on the 
reason for the termination having regard to the 
evidence provided by the parties and according 
to procedures provided for by national law and 
practice.’
17 See Pempena Sdn Bhd v Ahmad Zubaidee Yusof 
Omar [2007] 1 ILR 320.
18 See Transnorm System Sdn Bhd v Mollyza Abdul 
Majid [2003] 3  ILR 1400; Heap Loong Poultry 
Farm Sdn Bhd v Tan Ah Bah [2005] 3 ILR 558.
If the grounds for dismissal was misconduct, it is 
incumbent upon the employer to prove that the 
claimant had committed acts of misconduct, for 
example, intentionally falsifi ed the attendance,19 
medical record,20 company’s accounting record21 or 
committed thefts of its properties,22 among others. 
Where the reason for the dismissal was on grounds 
of alleged sexual harassment, the company must 
adduce convincing evidence to establish the 
alleged acts of sexual harassment. 
However, in certain circumstances the burden of 
proving the dismissal lies on the claimant. In cases 
of indirect or constructive dismissal, the burden 
is on the claimant to establish, on a balance of 
probabilities that the employer has committed the 
breach. For example, the transfer or demotion 
order was proven to be tainted with mala fi de. 
Again, if the claimant alleges that he was coerced 
to sign a resignation letter or that he had signed a 
document which later turns out to be a resignation 
letter, the burden is on him to establish that the 
resignation was not voluntary but forced upon him 
by the employer.23
The court shall, upon hearing all concerned parties 
and the evidence presented, make a decision 
based on the evidence collected.24 The court 
will also ascertain whether the employer has 
acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating the 
reasons as suffi cient to warrant the dismissal. If the 
19 See Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Zarina Abdul 
Latif [2007] 2 ILR 228.
20 See Sime Bank Bhd v Mohd Shaib Md Yusof 
[2003]  2  ILR 530. In Ibrahim Abdul Hamid 
v Malaysia Airline Systems Bhd (MAS) [2013] 2 
LNS 1650, the claimant’s dismissal for allegedly 
submitting forged medical certifi cate was held 
as reasonable. The Industrial Court noted that, 
‘it was only proper and right that the employer 
terminated his services. It is not wrong for the 
Company to require a degree of integrity and 
honesty that the Claimant as a Security Offi cer 
for some years was expected to show and 
discharge. That trust has been displaced when 
the Claimant commits such an act. It matters 
less whether he knew that the medical certifi cate 
was false or not.’
21 See Maybank, Johor v Mohd Najib Salim 
[1997] 3 ILR 435.
22 See Press Metal Berhad v Mustafa Ngamil & 
Anor [2007] 3 ILR 251.
23 See Food Specialities (M) Sdn Bhd v M Halim 
Manap @ Abd Manaf [1992] 2 ILR 311; Hotel 
Grand Continental Johor Bahru v Sim Chee 
Kheong [2006] 2 ILJU 111.
24 Goon Kwee Phoy v J & P Coats (M) Bhd [1981] 
2 MLJ 129.
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employer fails to discharge the burden, the court 
would then declare that the claimant’s dismissal 
was without just cause or excuse. Likewise, if the 
employee failed to establish his alleged constructive 
dismissal, the court will hold his dismissal to be with 
just cause or excuse. Furthermore, any party who 
are unhappy or dissatisfi ed with the decision of the 
Industrial Court may fi le a judicial review application 
against the said decision in the High Court. 
It is obvious from the above that the proceeding 
before the Industrial Court is adversarial in nature. 
The course of the trial is controlled by the parties 
through their advocates and parts of the litigation 
proceedings would include investigating and 
preparing for the court proceedings. During the 
trial, the parties may decide on the evidence that 
would be introduced to support their case or claim. 
Parties who engage a lawyer to bring or defend an 
unfair dismissal claim in court will incur expenses 
which would include the fees for engaging a 
lawyer, court fi ling and processing fees, experts, 
consultants and witness fees, process servers 
fee and miscellaneous expenses such as travel 
expenses, photocopying, postage and telephone 
charges among others.25 The question however is 
whether such expenses are recoverable. 
At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to note the 
distinction between professional legal fees and the 
court awarded costs. The former is what a person 
would have to pay for his lawyer to carry out the 
work for him, while the latter is what the court 
would usually award when a person succeeds with 
his claim or defence. Basically, the court awarded 
costs are intended to reimburse the successful 
party for the expenses incurred in having to claim 
or defend his case in court and the amount given 
would be assessed and determined by the judge 
based on several factors such as the complexity of 
the case, the skill and the specialised knowledge 
of the counsel among others.26
Costs for bringing or defending unfair dismissal 
claims
In the civil courts, awarding costs is at the discretion 
of the court and the general principle is that costs 
are to follow the event. The successful party is 
entitled to be paid costs unless there are special 
25 See Order 59 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012.
26 See Fahri Azzat, ‘The Distinction between 
Legal Fees and Court Costs’ at http://www.
malaysianbar.org.my/members_opinions_and_
comments/the_distinction_between_legal_fees_
and_court_costs.html
grounds to order otherwise. Item 15 of the Schedule 
in the Courts of Judicature Act  1964 conferred 
power on the High Court to award costs. The 
procedure on awarding costs and the scale of costs 
are contained in Order  59 of the Rules of Court 
2012 and Appendix  1 to the Order, respectively. 
The general rule in awarding costs is set out in 
Order 59 rule 3: “If the Court in the exercise of its 
discretion sees fi t to make any order as to the costs 
of or incidental to any proceedings, the Court shall, 
subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the 
event, except when it appears to the Court that in 
the circumstances of the case some other Order 
should be made as to the whole or any part of the 
costs.” This means that unless there are express 
and specifi c reasons why an order for costs should 
not be made, the successful party should receive 
the costs. 
In Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2),27 Nourse LJ stated: 
“Costs are in the discretion of the court. They 
should follow the event, except when it appears 
to the court that in the circumstances of the case 
some other order should be made. The general 
rule does not cease to apply simply because the 
successful party raises issues or makes allegations 
on which he fails, but where that has caused a 
signifi cant increase in the length or cost of the 
proceedings he may be deprived of the whole or 
a part of his costs.” 
In exercising its discretion, the court would normally 
take into account factors such as any offer of 
settlement, the conduct of the parties including 
conduct before and during the proceedings, the 
conduct of the parties in relation to any attempts at 
resolving the cause or matter by mediation or any 
other means of dispute resolution and in particular, 
the extent to which the parties have followed any 
relevant pre-action protocol or practise direction for 
the time being issued by the Registrar.28 In certain 
circumstances however the court may decide that 
there would be no order as to costs and this would 
mean that each party will end up paying its own 
costs of the proceedings. 
However, the power of the Industrial Court to 
award costs is discussed below with reference to 
claims under section 20 of the IRA. It is common 
for a party to Industrial Court proceedings to ask 
whether or not they would be able to recover their 
costs from the opponent should they succeed 
in their claim. Where the unfair dismissal claim 
27 [1993] 1 All ER 232, at p 237.
28 Order 59 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court 2012.
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is frivolous, unreasonable or groundless it would 
certainly involve time and money to defend. It is 
noteworthy that the Industrial court is clogged 
with backlog of dismissal cases and this has 
contributed to the delays in the dispensation of 
justice. Failure to observe the time schedule or 
the hearing dates,29 unnecessary requests for 
adjournment,30 postponement of cases,31 transfer 
of judge,32 and failure to effect service of process,33 
among others are some of the common factors 
that have contributed to the delay. The request for 
postponement or adjournment may be due to some 
genuine reasons such as illness of a party, family 
member or witness, unavailability of a key witness, 
29 In Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan 
(Felda) & Anor v Awang Soh bin Mamat & Ors 
[2009] 4 MLJ 610, CA, James Foong FCJ 
observed: ‘Waste of judicial time and resources 
undermines the efforts of the Judiciary to 
eradicate the backlog of cases faced by the 
courts’.
30 In Anne Lim Keng See v Malayan Banking Berhad 
[2009] 9 MLJ 502, Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal JC 
stated that: ‘A case that is adjourned will have to 
be reallocated fresh trial dates which will affect 
other cases. The parties and the witnesses may 
become disillusioned after having taken time off 
and incurring expenses to be then told that the 
case is adjourned. As a consequence, public 
trust and confi dence in the judicial system may 
be seriously impaired and undermined. For 
these reasons, it is imperative that once a case 
is set down for hearing, unless there are good 
and satisfactory reasons, there should be no 
adjournments. The reasons which are advanced 
for the purpose of seeking an adjournment must 
also emanate from circumstances beyond the 
control of the parties’.
31 In Public Prosecutor v Foo Kim Lai [2009] 1 MLJ 
211, the High Court proceeded with the appeal 
notwithstanding the absence of the respondent. 
To postpone the case to a later date according 
to the Court, would only add to the  backlog of 
cases for the court to dispose of.
32 In Pembinaan Majujaya & 2 Ors v Lau Tiong IK 
Construction Sdn Bhd [2008] 1 MLJU 17, Hamid 
Sultan Bin Abu Backer JC stated: ‘...courts are 
often inundated with much backlog of cases and 
more often than not, adjudicators are moved 
from one place to another with short notice and/
or reach retirement age without making sure that 
the grounds of judgment are delivered before 
retirement and/or transfer’.
33 In Castle Inn Sdn Bhd v Bumiputra-Commerce 
Bank Bhd [2009] 1 MLJ 542, CA it was stated 
that, ‘failure on the part of the plaintiff to effect 
expeditious service thereof would result in the 
Court being inundated with unserved writs, 
thereby contributing to the infamous backlog of 
cases’.
inability to locate the witness or document or that 
the parties are negotiating for settlement. A fair 
and timely access to justice may be signifi cantly 
impaired when the request for postponement 
comes days before a hearing, on the day of the 
hearing itself or during the hearing which would 
undoubtedly burden the other party fi nancially and 
such losses must be recoverable.
Power of Industrial Court to award costs 
Section 62 of the IRA conferred power to 
the Minister to make regulations on matters 
enumerated therein and this includes the awarding 
of costs of proceedings before the Court.34 
Regulation 5 of the Industrial Relations Regulations 
1967 has conferred the power to the President of 
the Industrial Court to make orders with respect 
to costs  and expenses, including expenses of 
witnesses of proceedings before the Court. In 
practice, however, the awarding of costs by the 
Industrial Court seems to be the exception rather 
than the rule.35 Generally, each party will bear 
their own costs even if the claimant is successful 
in bringing a claim against the respondent or the 
respondent, in defending their contention that the 
claimant’s dismissal was with just cause or excuse. 
In Standard Chartered Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v 
Standard Chartered Bank Offi cers Association,36 
Yussof Ahmad, Chairman of the Industrial Court, 
stated: “It is indeed an established practice that 
the court does not order costs. Regulation 5 has 
not been implemented and it is not a mandatory 
regulation. The court while welcoming amicable 
settlement does not see anything wrong for a 
party to have its dispute adjudicated by the court. 
It should not punish a party for this.
34 Section 62(b) of the IRA provides: ‘The Minister 
may make regulations for the purpose of carrying 
out or giving effect to this Act and in particular 
without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing, the regulations may:- (b) authorise the 
making of orders with respect to the costs and 
expenses including the expenses of witnesses 
of proceedings before the Court or Board.’
35 See Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd / Shell 
Malaysia Limited v John Christopher Johns 
[2007] 2 ILR 566; Pernas International Holdings 
Bhd & Anor v National Union of Hotel, Bar 
& Restaurant Workers Peninsular Malaysia 
[2003] 2 ILR 427 and Standard Chartered Bank 
(Malaysia) Bhd v Standard Chartered Bank 
Officers Association [2000] 3 ILR 316; Sun 
Media Group Sdn Bhd v Ganesh Sahathevan 
[2006] 2 ILR 1057.
36 [2000] 3 ILR 316.
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It is noteworthy in cases such as where there was an 
application to struck off the lawsuit,37 an amendment 
to the pleadings,38 joinder of parties,39 substitution of 
respondent40 and variation of award,41 each of the 
parties had to bear their own costs. However, when 
recording the terms of consent award, the parties may 
agree on the payment of costs by the other42 or that 
each party would bear their own costs.43  For example, 
in Khairielnizan Othman v Wekajaya Sdn Bhd,44 
respondent raised a preliminary objection requesting 
the court to strike out the claimant’s representation 
37 In Chee Tan Bee Chin v Palmgold Corporation 
Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 LNS 0710, the company 
applied to struck off the claimant’s claim for 
dismissal without just cause or excuse the 
ground that wrong company was being brought 
by the Claimant to the Industrial Court. It was 
argued that the holding company, that is, 
Palmgold Corporation Sdn Bhd, is the right party 
to be brought to this Court. The Court disallows 
the company’s application to strike off this case 
with no order as to costs.
38 In Rudra Prasad Adhikari v Kentus Industry 
Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 LNS 0854,  the respondent 
application for an order to amend the Statement 
of Reply was allowed but there was no order as 
to costs.
39 In Joo Chooi Me v Sampro Distribution Sdn Bhd 
[2019] 2 LNS 0335, the claimant had applied for 
inter alia an order to join the company’s holding 
company namely, Samchem Holdings Berhad as 
co-respondent to this action. The Industrial Court 
however, dismissed the claimant’s application 
with no order as to costs.
40 In Kong Ping Huz v Tan Sri Dato’ Khoo Chai Kaa 
[2018] 2 LNS 1505, the claimant’s application 
for an order that Tan Sri Dato’ Khoo Chai Kaa 
be substituted as the respondent in this case in 
place of the Federation of Hokkien Associations 
of Malaysia was allowed with no order as to costs.
41 In Azilan Shhruddin v Shangri-La (KL) Sdn Bhd 
[2014] 4 ILJ 338, the applicant applied for a 
variation of Award No. 635 of 2010 to include 
the seventh collective agreement which was 
not brought to the attention of the court when 
the application for non-compliance was heard. 
The respondent who had no objection to this 
application had prayed that costs of RM2,000.00 
be awarded in favour of the respondent. While 
approving the application for variation, the court 
did not award any costs. 
42 In Jeffrey Tan Lai Hock v Chevron Malaysia 
Limited [2014] 2 LNS 1365, the parties amicably 
resolved their case and among the terms of the 
consent award was that the company agreed to 
pay the sum RM25,000.00 as legal costs to the 
claimant.
43 See Paul Si Poh Lim v Tribune Press Sdn Bhd 
[2013] 2 LNS 1491.
44 [2007] 1 ILR 49.
allegedly because the claimant had failed to comply 
with the mandatory time limit prescribed under 
section  20(1A) of the IRA. The application was 
however dismissed with no order as to costs. Again, 
in Hanafi  Salleh v Malaysia International Shipping 
Corporation Berhad,45 the claimant’s request for 
postponement of the trial due to the death of a family 
member was allowed by the Court. However, the 
respondent’s request for costs to offset their fi nancial 
losses due to the abrupt postponement of the trial 
was declined as the claimant had genuine reasons 
to request for the postponement.
The Industrial Court has allowed the order as to 
costs in exceptional circumstances. However, 
there is no rule of thumb as to what amounts 
to exceptional circumstances as every case has 
to be assessed based upon its own particular 
circumstances. In Teo Bee Hung v LJS Resources 
Sdn Bhd,46 the Industrial Court in dismissing the 
application for variation of the Award No.  1408 
of 2007 ordered the applicant/respondent to pay 
costs to the claimant for the expenses borne by her 
to travel from Kapit to Sibu to attend the hearing of 
this application. Again, in Sudirman Wan Mansor v 
Kelab Golf Sarawak,47 the Industrial Court invoked 
its power under regulation 5 and ordered the club 
to pay the claimant’s costs and expenses for the 
air ticket and hotel accommodation in attending 
the reference in Kuching, Sarawak.
In fact, in several cases the chairman of the Industrial 
Court had proposed the awarding of costs to the 
respondent for defending an unmeritorious claim. 
In Sama World Asia Sdn Bhd v Teh Soo Seng,48 
Tan Yeak Hui, the chairman of the Industrial Court, 
stated: ‘As there are no costs to be awarded against 
the losing employee there is no deterrent against the 
employee in pursuing claims that are weak and often 
after a few case management sessions found to be 
almost unsustainable. The reluctance by the higher 
paid employees to withdraw their claims against 
their former employers even though their cases 
may look weak is obvious. The question of costs 
has for years been a very sensitive issue and if left 
unresolved may also contribute towards clogging up 
the system thereby leading to more delays.’ Again, 
in Yano Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Fazila Bahadin,49 
45 [2012] 2 LNS 0257. 
46 [2008] 1 ILR 411.
47 [2007] 4 ILR 501.
48 [2008] 1 ILR 112, at p 124; See also Mother’s 
Nursing Home v Pakiam Veerappan [2000] 2 ILR 
580.
49 [2008] 1 ILR 317.
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the Industrial Court stated that litigants should not 
have the uncontrolled use of a trial judge’s time. 
‘This court would have failed in its duty if it does 
not jealously guard the usage of judicial time and 
resources especially in the Industrial Court where 
no cost is imposed upon litigants pursuing at times 
glaringly frivolous issues without merits.’ 
In light of the above, it is submitted that the Industrial 
Court should award costs which  fl ow with the result 
of litigation or costs which follow the event. The 
awarding of costs is necessary since the claimant, 
in enforcing his job security or the respondent, in 
defending their claim that the claimant’s dismissal 
was with just cause would defi nitely incur costs, it 
is only fair that the succeeding party is awarded 
the party-to-party costs.50
It may be added that a party aggrieved with the 
award of the Industrial Court may question the 
award in the High Court by way of judicial review.51 
The award of the Industrial Court may successfully 
be challenged for excess or lack of jurisdiction, 
error of law on the face of the record, breach of the 
rules of natural justice or where the determination 
was procured by fraud, collusion or perjury, and as 
noted earlier, the High Court has the discretion to 
award costs to the successful party.52
50 Party to party costs are intended to reimburse the 
successful party for legal costs which they have 
paid or owe to their solicitor: http://www.olsc.
nsw.gov.au/Documents/Fact%20Sheet%20
3%20Types%20of%20costs%20July2015%20
AC.pdf
51 The judicial review power of the High Court 
is contained in section 25, read together with 
paragraph 1 of the Schedule of the Courts of 
Judicature Act 1964. The procedure involved 
in judicial review application is governed by the 
Specifi c Relief Act 1950 and Order 53 of the 
Rules of the Court 2012.
52 See Chan Hock Liong v Associated Motor 
Industries (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 1 ILR 249, CA; 
Marulee (M) Sdn Bhd v Menteri Sumber Manusia 
& Anor [2008] 1 ILR 260; Mohd Baharin Hj Abu 
v Perbadanan Perwira Harta Malaysia & Anor 
[2008] 1 ILR 277; Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Ramli 
Akim [2008] 1 ILR 288; Josephine Banun Pako 
v Hong Leong Bank Bhd [2008]  7 CLJ 699; 
Abu Samah Othman v Oriental Assemblers Sdn 
Bhd [2007]  3  ILR 1; Dr David Vanniasingham 
Ramanathan v Subang Jaya Medical Centre 
Sdn Bhd [2007]  1 MLJ 713; Exxon Chemical 
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Menteri Sumber Manusia, 
Malaysia & Ors [2007] 3 MLJ 1; K A Sanduran 
Nehru Ratnam v I-Berhad [2007]  2 MLJ 430; 
Menteri Sumber Manusia v John Hancock Life 
Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd & Another Appeal 
[2007] 1 ILR 274.
Awarding costs to successful litigant: The 
practice in other jurisdictions
The practise of awarding costs to succeeding 
litigants for bringing or defending the unfair 
dismissal claim in other jurisdictions is discussed 
below.
(i) United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Employment Tribunal 
is empowered to award costs to party succeeding 
in bringing or defending a claim involving unfair 
dismissal. Regulation 76 of the Employment 
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) 
Regulations 2013 provides that the Tribunal may 
award costs in the following circumstances: (i) a 
party, or their representative, has acted vexatiously, 
abusively, disruptively, or otherwise unreasonably in 
the bringing or conducting of the proceedings, (ii) a 
claim or defence to a claim made in the proceedings 
had no reasonable prospect of success, (iii) a 
party was in breach of any order or practise 
direction given by the Tribunal, or (iv) a hearing 
was postponed or adjourned on the application 
of a party.53 
Further, the procedure to apply for costs is 
contained in regulation 77. It provides: ‘A party may 
53 Regulation 76 of the Employment Tribunals 
(Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 
2013 provides: “(1) A Tribunal may make a costs 
order or a preparation time order, and shall 
consider whether to do so, where it considers 
that -  (a) a party (or that party’s representative) 
has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or 
otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing 
of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the 
proceedings (or part) have been conducted; or 
(b) any claim or response had no reasonable 
prospect of success. 
(2) A Tribunal may also make such an order 
where a party has been in breach of any 
order or practice direction or where a hearing 
has been postponed or adjourned on the 
application of a party. 
(3) Where in proceedings for unfair dismissal 
a fi nal hearing is postponed or adjourned, 
the Tribunal shall order the respondent to 
pay the costs incurred as a result of the 
postponement or adjournment if – (a) the 
claimant has expressed a wish to be reinstated 
or re-engaged which has been communicated 
to the respondent not less than 7 days before 
the hearing; and (b) the postponement or 
adjournment of that hearing has been caused 
by the respondent’s failure, without a special 
reason, to adduce reasonable evidence as 
to the availability of the job from which the 
claimant was dismissed or of comparable or 
suitable employment.
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apply for a costs order or a preparation time order 
at any stage up to 28 days after the date on which 
the judgment fi nally determining the proceedings 
in respect of that party was sent to the parties. 
No such order may be made unless the paying 
party has had a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the 
Tribunal may order) in response to the application.’ 
While the amount of a costs order is contained in 
regulation 78. It provides:  
‘(1) A costs order may – 
(a) order the paying party to pay the receiving 
party a specifi ed amount, not exceeding 
£20,000, in respect of the costs of the 
receiving party; 
(b) order the paying party to pay the receiving 
party the whole or a specifi ed part of the 
costs of the receiving party, with the amount 
to be paid being determined, in England 
and Wales, by way of detailed assessment 
carried out either by a county court in 
accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules 
1998, or by an Employment Judge applying 
the same principles; or, in Scotland, by 
way of taxation carried out either by the 
auditor of court in accordance with the Act 
of Sederunt (Fees of Solicitors in the Sheriff 
Court)(Amendment and Further Provisions) 
1993(23), or by an Employment Judge 
applying the same principles; 
(c) order the paying party to pay the receiving 
party a specifi ed amount as reimbursement 
of all or part of a Tribunal fee paid by the 
receiving party; 
(d) order the paying party to pay another party 
or a witness, as appropriate, a specifi ed 
amount in respect of necessary and 
reasonably incurred expenses (of the kind 
described in rule 75(1)(c)); or 
(e) if the paying party and the receiving party 
agree as to the amount payable, be made 
in that amount. 
(2) Where the costs order includes an amount in 
respect of fees charged by a lay representative, 
for the purposes of the calculation of the order, 
the hourly rate applicable for the fees of the 
lay representative shall be no higher than the 
rate under rule 79(2). 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, the amount 
of a costs order under sub-paragraphs (b) 
to (e) of paragraph (1) may exceed £20,000.’
(ii) Canada 
In Canada, if the complainant is successful, the 
adjudicator has the power to order the employer 
to pay some or all of the complainant’s costs. This 
power is derived pursuant to section 242(4)(c) of the 
Canadian Labour Code which provides: ‘Where an 
adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (3) that a 
person has been unjustly dismissed, the adjudicator 
may, by order, require the employer who dismissed 
the person to - (a) pay the person compensation not 
exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to 
the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, 
have been paid by the employer to the person; 
(b)  reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do 
any other like thing that it is equitable to require the 
employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any 
consequence of the dismissal.’ 
In Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro of Canada Ltd 
v Lee-Shanok,54 the applicant contended, inter 
alia, that an adjudicator had no authority to award 
costs in an unfair dismissal proceeding under the 
Canada Labour Code. In rejecting that argument, 
Stone J stated: 
‘I will not repeat what I have already said 
on the construction of paragraph (c). I have 
diffi culty in reading it, with its broad reference 
to granting relief that is “equitable to require 
the employer to do in order to remedy or 
counteract any consequence of the dismissal”, 
as including the power to award costs. The 
difficulty I have is in viewing an award of 
compensation, gained at some considerable 
expense to a complainant in terms of legal 
costs, as to have the effect of making him 
whole. Legal costs incurred would effectively 
reduce compensation for lost remuneration, 
while their allowance would appear to remedy 
or, at least, to counteract a consequence of 
the dismissal. I am not persuaded by the 
Applicant’s contention that paragraph (c) 
does not permit an award of costs because 
the only pecuniary award contemplated by 
Parliament is compensation as provided for in 
paragraph (a). I understand paragraph (c) as 
extending the range of possible remedies 
somewhat beyond those already specifi ed 
in paragraphs (a) and (b). While we are not 
called upon here to defi ne its true breadth, 
I am satisfi ed that it does surely embrace the 
awarding of costs to a successful complainant 
in appropriate circumstances.’
54 (1988) 87 NR 178.
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Hence, when making the closing arguments the 
complainant may ask the adjudicator for costs in 
the event the dismissal is found to have been unjust.
(iii) New Zealand
In New Zealand, the successful party would 
receive an award of costs against the other party. 
The power of the Employment Relations Authority 
to order any party to pay the costs of any other 
party is set out in clause 15 of the second schedule 
to the Employment Relations Act 2000. This power 
will be exercised if the parties are unable to agree 
on the issue of costs between themselves. Clause 
15 of the second schedule provides: ‘(1)  The 
Authority may order any party to a matter to 
pay to any other party such costs and expenses 
(including expenses of witnesses) as the Authority 
thinks reasonable. (2) The Authority may apportion 
any such costs and expenses between the parties 
or any of them as it thinks fi t, and may at any time 
vary or alter any such order in such manner as it 
thinks reasonable’. 
Further, the Practice Note No 2 entitled: ‘Costs 
in the Employment Relations Authority’ provides: 
‘Parties to proceedings in the Authority ought 
always to remember in evaluating their proceedings 
that if they are unsuccessful, they will almost 
always face the prospect of having to make a 
contribution to the costs of the successful party, 
as well as meeting their own costs… Generally, the 
presiding Member will discuss the costs regime 
at the case management conference if the issue 
appears to warrant such discussion, and Members 
will be ready to explain to parties, if requested, the 
principles that are used to apportion costs at the 
conclusion of an Authority investigation.’55
(iv) Australia
In Australia, the disputants shall bear their own legal 
costs in a matter before the Fair Work Commission 
(FWC). However, the Fair Work Act 2009 empowers 
the Commission to order against a party to a 
matter for costs incurred by the other party to the 
matter if the FWC is satisfi ed that the fi rst party 
caused those costs to be incurred because of an 
unreasonable act or omission of the fi rst party in 
connection with the conduct or continuation of the 
matter.56 The FWC may also order one party to an 
unfair dismissal matter to pay the other party’s legal 
55 See Practice Note 2 at https://www.era.govt.
nz/assets/Uploads/ERA/ERA-Costs-Practice-
Note-0616.pdf
56 Section 400A, Fair Work Act 2009.
or representational costs when the Commission is 
satisfi ed that the matter commenced or responded 
was vexatious or without reasonable cause, or with 
no reasonable prospect of success. In particular, 
section 401(1A) provides: “The FWC may make 
an order for costs against the representative for 
costs incurred by the other party to the matter 
if the FWC is satisfied that the representative 
caused those costs to be incurred because: (a) the 
representative encouraged the person to start, 
continue or respond to the matter and it should 
have been reasonably apparent that the person had 
no reasonable prospect of success in the matter; 
or (b)  of an unreasonable act or omission of the 
representative in connection with the conduct or 
continuation of the matter.” 
The general provision on costs is also contained 
in section 611 where the above section provides: 
“(1)  A person must bear the person’s own 
costs in relat ion to a matter before the Fair 
Work Commission. 
(2)   However, the Fair Work Commission 
may order a person (the fi rst person) to bear 
some or all of the costs of another person 
in relation to an application to the Fair Work 
Commission if:  
(a) the Fair Work Commission is satisfi ed that 
the fi rst person made the application, or the 
fi rst person responded to the application, 
vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or  
(b) the Fair Work Commission is satisfi ed that 
it should have been reasonably apparent 
to the fi rst person that the fi rst person’s 
application, or the fi rst person’s response 
to the application, had no reasonable 
prospect of success.” 
Further, the Fair Work Regulations 2009 includes a 
‘schedule of costs’ which provides the Commission 
with guidance when exercising its jurisdiction to 
make an order for costs.
Conclusion
A party who brings or defends an unfair dismissal 
claim would undoubtedly incur expenses and as 
noted earlier, in some jurisdictions the unsuccessful 
party may have to face the prospect of having to 
make a contribution to the costs of the successful 
party and this is aside from meeting their own 
costs. In Malaysia however, although the Industrial 
Court has the power to award costs and expenses 
of witnesses appearing at the trial, it is seldom 
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ordered. The practice however is that each party will 
bear their own legal fees whether they win or lose. 
It is submitted that the awarding of costs by the 
Industrial Court should be made the rule rather than 
the exception, especially when either party had 
acted unreasonably in bringing or defending the 
claim or where the claim was vexatious or without 
reasonable cause, or with no reasonable prospect 
of success. It is further submitted that by awarding 
costs based on the outcome of the trial, the parties 
and their representatives would be more committed 
in fi nding an amicable solution to the dispute at the 
early neutral evaluation process carried out by the 
Settlement Chairman or an Assistant Registrar of 
the Industrial Court.57 
It should be noted that an early evaluation 
or assessment would be done based on the 
pleadings and other documents fi led by the parties 
in the court, including the evidence and the legal 
arguments that may be raised by either parties at 
the early evaluation stage. All the documents and 
other matters raised will be critically reviewed and 
thereafter, the evaluator will provide an unbiased 
evaluation of the merits of each party’s case. He 
would also give the parties some indication as 
to where they stand, and provide guidance on 
the most possible outcome if the case goes to 
trial. In other words, the parties will receive an 
assessment of the likeliest outcome of the case if it 
was heard by the court alongside the costs of that 
57 See ‘Ear ly  Neutra l  Eva luat ion’  (www.
buildingdisputestribunal.co.nz).
process.58 It must be added that awarding costs 
should not be considered as a punishment or as 
an expression of disapproval of the unsuccessful 
party’s conduct but rather to recompense the 
successful party for the expenses it had incurred 
either in enforcing his statutory rights or defending 
the stand taken. 
As a fi nal remark it would be worthwhile to heed the 
observation by YA Tan Yeak Hui, Chairman of the 
Industrial Court, in Hotel Grand Continental Johor 
Bahru v Sim Chee Kheong.59 
‘Those who wish to take a gamble must be 
prepared to pay a premium. It would be most 
unfair and inequitable to allow or encourage a 
Claimant to indiscriminately drag his employer 
to Court without him fully appreciating the 
inconvenience and cost incurred by the 
employer. The fact that Claimants are not 
penalized with costs in the event of failure to 
prove their case should not be abused. There 
must be a balanced and level playing fi eld in 
the arena of industrial adjudication. It is most 
essential that if confi dence is to be maintained 
in the Industrial Court, the power balance 
between the parties must be closely guarded 
and maintained, in order that social justice be 
allowed to fl ourish.’
58 Mark A Myers ‘What is an Early Evaluation of 
Case?’ (www.resolutionsadr.com/id32.html).
59 [2006] 2 LNS 0530.A
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